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 Security Log Analysis Tutorial Goals
● Today you can expect us to:
● Take you thru the Log Analysis Lifecycle
● Provide log analysis examples of real attacks with logs from Bro, 
Apache, Postfix, Duo, OpenSSH, etc.
● Encourage interactive Q&A throughout
● You should take away
● Ideas to improve your security logging & monitoring
● Command examples that you can customize for use on your own logs.
● Methods you can generalize to explore and connect events across logs
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 Log analysis workflow
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 Overview
● Collection
● Log sources
● Intelligence
● Data Enrichment
● Event Management
● Analysis
● Response
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Security Log Analysis Image source: https://pixabay.com/en/pokemon-ball-pokemon-go-video-games-1530315/
 Collection Sources
● Logs
● System: Syslogs, Windows events, Host-based IDS, etc.
● Network: netflows, Bro, Snort, etc.
● Application: Apache, VPN, OAuth, etc.
● Intelligence
● REN-ISAC SES, Critical Stack, Team Cymru MHR, ...
● Data Enrichment
● Additional information to complement logs
● LDAP, DHCP, Inventories
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 Collection - Logs
● Syslog
● Windows Event Logs
● HIDS
▪ OSSEC
▪ Auditd
▪ Keystroke logs
● Netflows
● Bro/NIDS
● Web servers, mod_security
● DNS
● Scans
NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 -- August 15th, 2017
Security Log Analysis
Image source:  https://pixabay.com/en/wood-logs-lumber-woodpile-firewood-1209632/
 ● De Facto framework on Linux systems
● System & any software can log to it
● Can log centrally; default unreliable UDP
● Components
● Priority
● Timestamp
● Hostname
● Process
● Message
Collection - Logs - Syslog
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 Priority (Facility + Severity): e.g. <38>, <86>
Collection - Logs - Syslog
FACILTY
0 kern kernel messages
1 user user-level messages
2 mail mail system
3 daemon system daemons
4 auth security/authorization messages
5 syslog messages generated internally by syslogd
6 lpr line printer subsystem
7 news network news subsystem
8 uucp UUCP subsystem
9 clock daemon
10 authpriv security/authorization messages
11 ftp FTP daemon
12 - NTP subsystem
13 - log audit
14 - log alert
15 cron scheduling daemon
16 local0 local use 0 (local0)
17 local1 local use 1 (local1)
18 local2 local use 2 (local2)
19 local3 local use 3 (local3)
20 local4 local use 4 (local4)
21 local5 local use 5 (local5)
22 local6 local use 6 (local6)
23 local7 local use 7 (local7)
SEVERITY
0 emerg System is unusable
1 alert
2 crit Critical conditions
3 err Error conditions
4 warning
5 notice Events that are unusual, but not error conditions.
6 info Normal operational messages that require no action.
7 debug Information useful to developers for debugging the application.
NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 -- August 15th, 2017
Security Log Analysis
 Syslog Examples - SSH
<38>Aug  1 09:13:58 groot sshd[19468]: Accepted publickey for wraquel from 
10.12.23.15 port 49474 ssh2: RSA 
2b:cb:82:f0:22:d7:8a:f6:cd:70:43:b3:de:cf:5d:ee
<86>2016-08-01T09:13:48.764820-05:00 bastion sshd[2193]: Accepted 
keyboard-interactive/pam for wraquel from 10.12.23.15 port 49458 ssh2
<38>Aug  1 14:05:17 dev2 sshd[31622]: Failed password for root from 
10.11.128.16 port 48593 ssh2
<38>Aug  1 09:37:20 honeypot sshd[9256]: Failed password for invalid user 
pi from 192.168.58.61 port 59699 ssh2
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 Syslog issues
● Only so much can be conveyed in text
● Unicode can sometimes cause issues
● Relays may include additional relay hostnames
● Timestamps may be off
● Timezone discrepancies
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 Collection - Logs - Windows Event Logs
● Stored locally; Overwrites itself
● Can be centrally collected
● Unicode
● Very Verbose
● Central Storage a.k.a. Subscriptions
NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 -- August 15th, 2017
Security Log Analysis
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 Collection - Logs - Windows Event Logs
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 Collection - Logs - Windows Event Logs
NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 -- August 15th, 2017
Security Log Analysis
 Collection - Logs - Windows Event Logs
Aug  2 13:43:21 D4N6 MSWinEventLog#0111#011Security#0 Aug 02 13:43:21 
2016#0114634#011Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing#011N/A#011N/A#011Succe
ss Audit#011D4N6#011Logoff#011#011An account was logged off.    Subject:   Security 
ID:  S-1-5-21-3934507682-2419030825-887421081-1004   Account Name:  wraquel   
Account Domain:  D4N6   Logon ID:  0x688A5B    Logon Type:   10    This event is 
generated when a logon session is destroyed. It may be positively correlated with a 
logon event using the Logon ID value. Logon IDs are only unique between reboots on 
the same computer.#01113558#015
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 Collection - Logs - Windows Event Logs
● Working in mixed environments
● Subscription service to collect centrally
● Can be converted to Syslog
● Can be sent directly to some information managers
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 Collection - Logs - HIDS
● Usually provides
● File Integrity
● Rootkit detection
● Log Monitoring
● Process Monitoring
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 Collection – Scan Logs
● Sources
● NMAP
● Qualys
● Masscan
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 Overview
● Collection
● Log sources
● Intelligence
● Data Enrichment
● Event Management
● Analysis
● Response
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 Collection - Intelligence
● Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF)
● MISP
● OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) 
● Critical Stack
● whitelisting/blacklisting
● Internal business information
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 Overview
● Collection
● Log sources
● Intelligence
● Data Enrichment
● Event Management
● Analysis
● Response
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 Collection - Data Enrichment
● Helps define non-descript data
● Types
● hostnames
● groups
● users
● Sources
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Image source: https://pixabay.com/en/hammer-wrench-repair-work-industry-28636/
 nInfo example
https://github.com/JustinAzoff/ninfo
$ ninfo -p geoip -p cymruwhois 8.8.8.8 4.2.2.2
=== 8.8.8.8 === 
*** Cymru Whois (Cymru Whois lookup) ***
15169 US 8.8.8.0/24 GOOGLE - Google Inc.
*** GeoIP (GeoIP) ***
US - United States
=== 4.2.2.2 === 
*** Cymru Whois (Cymru Whois lookup) ***
3356 US 4.0.0.0/9 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications
*** GeoIP (GeoIP) ***
US - United States
NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 -- August 15th, 2017
Security Log Analysis
 Collection - Data Enrichment
● Helps define non-descript data
● Types
● Sources
● DHCP
● Lifecycle Management Tools (Foreman, 
puppet)
● CMDB
● Inventory
● Business information
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 Collection - Authorization
• Legal Issues
• Buy In
• Who owns the data?
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Image source: https://pixabay.com/en/meeting-relationship-business-1019771/
 Overview
● Collection
● Event Management
● Filtering
● Storage
● Indexing
● Accessibility
● Analysis
● Response
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 IEM – Considerations
•How do we send logs to a central location?
•What format are they in?
•Can this format be converted?
•How will we store this information for later retrieval?
•What rate is all this data coming in at?
•Do I want to store all this data or some of it?
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 Overview
● Collection
● Event Management
● Filtering
● Storage
● Indexing
● Accessibility
● Analysis
● Response
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 Filtering
● Reducing amount of incoming data
● Can we drop useless messages?
● Do we need all these sources?
● Sorting on the fly
● Timestamps
● Message Types
● Categorization
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 Overview
● Collection
● Event Management
● Filtering
● Storage
● Indexing
● Accessibility
● Analysis
● Response
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 Storage Goals – Information and 
Event Management
• Centralized access to information
• Consistent format
• Ease of access
• Machine parseable
• Human Readable
• Categorized
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Image source: https://pixabay.com/en/horizontal-old-weights-old-scale-930716/
 IEM – Storage Concerns
• Scalability
• I/O Limitations
• Long Term storage
• FOIA Requests
• Archivists
• Categorization
• Timestamp issues
• Raw vs Parsed
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 Overview
● Collection
● Event Management
● Filtering
● Storage
● Indexing
● Accessibility
● Analysis
● Response
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 Indexing
● Quicker access to raw data
● Keywords
● Timestamps/Frames
● Summaries
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 Overview
● Collection
● Event Management
● Filtering
● Storage
● Indexing
● Accessibility
● Analysis
● Response
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 IEM - Accessibility & Interfaces
• Dashboard Access
• Direct log access
• Permissions
• Data Sensitivity
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 IEM – Log Management Tools
• Splunk
• ELK
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http://opentica.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Screen-Shot-2014-02-25-at-4.42.52-PM-1024x557-830x451.png
http://www.splunk.com/content/dam/splunk/img/grafh.png
http://www.rsyslog.com/files/2015/06/Missing-tabs.png
 IEM – Log Management Tools
• May take years to tune
• Specialized Training
• Black box
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http://www.splunk.com/content/dam/splunk/img/grafh.png
http://www.rsyslog.com/files/2015/06/Missing-tabs.png
 Watch out: Useless metrics
• Don't be fooled by useless graphics and charts
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 Log analysis workflow
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 Overview
• Collection
• Event Management
• Analysis
• Response
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Image source: https://pixabay.com/en/arrows-growth-hacking-marketing-1229855/
 Analysis
• Manual
• Alerts
• Automated
• Deep Dives
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 Analysis
• Manual
• Requires domain knowledge
• Tool proficiency
• Alerts
• Automated
• Deep Dives
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 Analysis
• Manual
• Alerts
• Creates reports
• Can act (block, notify)
• Lots of tweaking
• Automated
• Deep Dives
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 Analysis
• Manual
• Alerts
• Automated
• Watch for false positives
• Track actions
• Review often
• Deep Dives
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 Analysis
• Manual
• Alerts
• Automated
• Deep Dives
• One off analysis
• May require access to data you don’t have access to
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 Analysis
• What about experience?
• Just act like a scientist.
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 Analysis - Scientific Method
• Make an observation
• Ask questions
• Develop testable predictions
• Test, test, test (refine)
• Develop a conclusion (was I correct?)
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 Introduction to Bro Logs
            "This is a better kind of bro."
              - Karen Sandler (Software Freedom Conservancy)
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 What is Bro?
● "Network Security Monitor"
● Inspects all network traffic
● Generates forensically sound logs
● See “Network Forensics With Bro” by Matthias Vallentin
● Has a scripting language, making it very extensible
● automation, custom functionality, etc.
● Crucial difference:
● IDS is logging "bad" things
● NSM is logging everything
● What if you didn't know that something was bad?
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 Bro Logs
● Goal: Determine what happened on the network
● Logs are small
● Logs are plain-text, tab-delimited CSV
● Designed for grep, sed, awk, sort, head, etc.
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 Bro Log Limitations
● Logs are an abstraction
● 100s of Gbps of input, a few GB/hour of output requires 
loss of data
● Only some protocols can be parsed
● Rising use of encryption
● Limited by network visibility
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 Example 1: IRC
141.142.11.2:4766 -> 164.32.77.23:6667
JOIN #foobar
irc.log Value
id.orig_h 141.142.11.2
id.orig_p 4766
id.resp_h 164.32.77.23
id.resp_p 6667
nick USA|74634
user [urX]-700159
command
v
JOIN
value #foobar
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 Example 2: HTTP
> GET /phpBB HTTP/1.1
< HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
http.log Value
id.orig_h 192.168.1.20
id.orig_p 7182
id.resp_h 141.142.192.147
id.resp_p 80
method GET
host www.ncsa.edu
uri
v
/phpBB
status_code 404
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 Types of Bro Logs: Network Protocols
● conn 
● dhcp
● dns
● ftp
● http
● irc
● kerberos
● mysql
● radius
● rdp
● sip
● smtp
● snmp
● socks
● ssh
● ssl
● syslog
● tunnel
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 Types of Bro Logs: Files
● files.log
● pe.log (Portable Executable)
● x509.log (Certificate information)
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 Types of Bro Logs: Detection
● intel.log (Intelligence data hits)
● notice.log (Alerts from Bro scripts)
● signatures.log (Traffic signature hits)
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 Types of Bro Logs:
Network Observations
● known_certs.log (SSL certs observed)
● known_devices.log (MAC addresses)
● known_hosts.log (IPs w/ established TCP)
● known_services.log (Open ports)
● software.log (Software w/ version info)
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 Bro - Viewing Logs
● less
● grep
● bro-cut
● try.bro.org
● ELK Stack / Elastic Stack
● Splunk
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 Bro - Viewing Logs (more commands)
● cat and zcat
● awk
● sort
● uniq
● wc
● head and tail
● while read -r MyVar ;
do something MyVar ;
done
Image source: http://www.commitstrip.com/en/2016/12/22/terminal-forever/
 Command syntax (grep)
Pattern:
grep [options] <search pattern> [file1] [file2] [...]
Real examples:
grep -i administrator syslog
grep -i administrator syslog | grep -v 172\.16\.0\.5
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 Command syntax (awk)
Pattern:
awk [options] <'program'> [file1] [file2] [...]
Starter program keywords:
● {print $0}   (action statements)
● $1, $2, ..., $NF
● $2=="foo",  $2!="foo"
● $3~/^[Bb]etty$/
● true || false,  true && true
● ()
● variable=value
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 How a command pipeline works
● Read in data, send output to next command
● Example (search for IP and count instances)
$ grep 10\.100\.52\.5 conn.log | wc -l
→ 507
● Example (show list of IPs ordered by count)
$ zcat conn.log.gz | awk -F\\t '{print $3}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
→ 155489 172.16.0.10
 2836 172.16.0.5
 1456 172.16.0.13
  813 172.16.0.2
   64 172.16.0.7
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 Brief regular expression primer
● A regex can be used to match patterns of text data.
● Use " " or ' ' to protect expression from shell interpretation.
● .  - matches any single character
● \. - Matches a literal . (use a \ before any special character)
● .* - matches any character zero or more times
● .+ - matches any character 1 or more times
● ^      - Matches the beginning of the line.
● $  - Matches the end of the line
● [a-z]- matches any letter between a and z in 1 position
● [a-zA-Z0-9] - Matches any alphanumeric in ASCII
● [^0-9] - Matches any character that is not 0 through 9.
● [0-9]{1,3}- Matches  any character 0 - 9 between 1 and 3 times
● (apple|banana|cherry) - Matches any of these words
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 Regex precision is important
Use ^2\.4\.150\.1$ to search for the IP 2.4.150.1
Why shouldn't I just run this?
grep "2.4.150.1" access_log
Because it will also match these IPs:
22.4.150.15
204.150.100.10
and these values:
2E4150A1
/script.php?id=12948150218
 Finding Compromised Systems
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 Phases of Compromise
1. Reconnaissance
2. Exploitation
3. Reinforcement
4. Consolidation
5. Pillage
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 Phases of Compromise
1. Reconnaissance
2. Exploitation
3. Reinforcement
4. Consolidation
5. Pillage
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 Recon: Searching for exploitable code
Which IP had the most HTTP 404 Not Found errors?
● What is a 404 not found error?
○ HTTP status return code to the client
● What logs track this information?
○ Bro's http.log
● What field is it in the bro log?
○ status_code
● How can we match a number in a log? *
○ awk, grep, sed
● How can we generate a top list? *
○ Collect like groups (sort)
○ Count the number of items in each group (uniq -c)
○ Order the counts. (sort -n)
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 Recon detection command (404s)
$ cat http.log |
bro-cut id.orig_h status_code | 
awk -F\\t '$2=="404"' |                     
sort | uniq -c | sort -n |      
tail -n 1
→   165 64.39.106.131 404
$ dig +short -x 64.39.106.131
→      sn031.s01.sea01.qualys.com
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 Recon: Can web app read filesystem?
Do any successful queries to Wordpress code contain filesystem paths in the query 
string?
● Where do wordpress requests get logged?
○ access_log (on Apache)
● What should I search for?
○ Filesystem path indicators like '/', '..', '/etc' or 
○ Specific filenames like my.cnf, passwd, .htaccess
● How can I figure out if the exploit attempt worked?
○ HTTP return status  (if 404, then probably not; 200 only means potentially)
○ Does the file referenced exist?
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 Recon detection command (web app)
$ grep -E "wp-admin.*\.\./.*\" 200 " access_log
→ 208.83.1.168 - - [23/May/2017:16:47:21 +0000] "GET 
/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=revslider_show_image&img=..
/../.my.cnf HTTP/1.1" 200 410 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; 
Linux i686; en-US; rv:0.9.3) Gecko/20010801"
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 Recon: Did a new exploit hit us in past?
Given that the recent Intel AMT vulnerability has been hidden in chips since 2010, can 
we find any indication of previous attacks against our network?
● What are we looking for?
○ meta data about traffic to tcp ports 16992 and 16993
● Where can we find this?
○ Bro's 'conn.log'
● How can we be sure the connections were successful?
○ Check that the conn_status column in conn.log is not "S0".
● Make a list of potential attackers first, save it to a file.
● Then investigate the overall activity of the potentials. 
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 Recon detection command (Intel AMT)
$ zcat 201[0-7]-*/conn.*.log.gz | 
  cat - current/conn.log | 
  awk -F\\t '($6==16992 || $6==16993) && $12!="S0"{print}'|
  less -S
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Image source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/3/3a/Hacker_inside.jpg
 Recon detection command (Intel AMT)
$ zcat 201[0-7]-*/conn.*.log.gz | 
  cat - current/conn.log | 
  awk -F\\t '($6==16992 || $6==16993) && $12!="S0"{print 
$3}' > potential-attackers.txt
$ zgrep -F -f potential-attackers.txt 
201[0-7]-*/conn.*.log.gz current/conn.log
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 Phases of Compromise
1. Reconnaissance
2. Exploitation
3. Reinforcement
4. Consolidation
5. Pillage
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 Compromise 1: http.log
> GET top4download.org/ (IE 11)
< 200 OK                (text/html)
id.resp_h 91.134.161.42
id.resp_p 80
method GET
host top4download.org
uri /
referrer -
user_agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
status_code 200
resp_mime_types text/html
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 Compromise 1: http.log
 id.resp_h 91.134.161.60id.resp_p 80
method GET
host roseindia.vip
uri /?644v0o1fsfarflf06=24&4e0flef...
referrer http://top4download.org/
user_agent (IE 11)
status_code 200
resp_mime_types text/html
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 Compromise 1: http.log
 id.resp_h 91.134.161.60id.resp_p 80
method GET
host roseindia.vip
uri /?644v0o1fsfarflf06=24&4e0flef...
referrer http://top4download.org/
user_agent (IE 11)
status_code 200
resp_mime_types text/html
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 Referrer Chain
1. > GET top4download.org/ (IE 11)               < 
  text/html
2. > GET 
roseindia.vip/?644v0o1fsfarflf06=24&4e0flef186v43re1bv=1280&37fj4d7g9
4969r=720 (IE 11)                       < 
  text/html
3. > GET 18a43zad864bo96.armlay.gdn/ (IE 11)      < 
  text/html
4. > GET 18a43zad864bo96.armlay.gdn/712g40rdf7k06 (IE 11)                              
< application/x-shockwave-flash
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 Overview for IP
91.134.161.42  GET  top4download.org     text/html
91.134.161.60  GET  roseindia.vip        text/html
62.138.5.199   GET  18a43z96.armlay.gdn  text/html
62.138.5.199   GET  18a43z96.armlay.gdn  application/x-shockwave-flash
62.138.5.199   GET  18a43z96.armlay.gdn  text/html
62.138.5.199   GET  18a43z96.armlay.gdn  application/x-shockwave-flash
62.138.5.199   GET  62.138.5.199         -
62.138.5.199   GET  62.138.5.199         application/x-dosexec
62.138.5.199   GET  62.138.5.199         application/x-dosexec
52.3.78.30     GET  ipinfo.io            text/json
NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 -- August 15th, 2017
Security Log Analysis
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 Overview for IP
1. Redirect chain with random-looking domain names, 
and suspicious TLDs (.vip, .gdn)
2. Shockwave Flash followed by Windows executable 
download
3. Queried for IP address information
NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 -- August 15th, 2017
Security Log Analysis
 Compromise 2: http.log
Jun 17 23:00:10 CcMeer3amA5aZ9nrx   107.160.46.226  4908   141.142.234.27  2375  1  GET   141.142.234.27   
  /version                                                                                 -  -                        
  0    145      200  OK         -  -  -  (empty)  -  -  -  -                   -          Fr5LXVyNQ3lRrs2tg   text/json
Jun 18 02:10:21 CFVSv31q8HACwAJSOc  107.160.46.226  4534   141.142.234.27  2375  1  GET   141.142.234.27   
  /v1.23/containers/json?all=0&limit=-1&trunc_cmd=0&size=0                                 -  python-requests/2.10.0   
  0    36000    200  OK         -  -  -  (empty)  -  -  -  -                   -          Fay4vxEzVjage6cy1   text/json
Jun 18 02:10:21 CQMaBW2KP1XCGMVNlb  107.160.46.226  4533   141.142.234.27  2375  1  GET   141.142.234.27   
  /version                                                                                 -  Python-urllib/2.7        
  0    145      200  OK         -  -  -  (empty)  -  -  -  -                   -          FUpmSO27PvsmkOk5n4  text/json
Jun 18 02:34:35 CqA2Xg3qh9Lrpi6IEj  107.160.46.226  2516   141.142.234.27  2375  1  GET   141.142.234.27   
  /version                                                                                 -  Python-urllib/2.7        
  0    145      200  OK         -  -  -  (empty)  -  -  -  -                   -          FHqbUe1aylw9O5YFP8  text/json
Jun 18 02:34:35 CTAMVF3Rv4jhcgBRAc  107.160.46.226  2517   141.142.234.27  2375  1  POST  141.142.234.27   
  /v1.23/containers/6df61c916b1aee2d72046ce92bbbc16dd01c9dfb847faa12286c9e3bcd5d745c/exec  -  python-requests/2.10.0   
  216  74       201  Created    -  -  -  (empty)  -  -  -  Fds3MstwaFnM6XAw8   text/json  FpxUE944g6vBSuAfkh  text/json
Jun 18 02:34:35 CTAMVF3Rv4jhcgBRAc  107.160.46.226  2517   141.142.234.27  2375  2  POST  141.142.234.27   
  /v1.23/exec/182881b4e9e685453e610021892788085ab814518bde903c957cfdc272066d01/start       -  python-requests/2.10.0   
  31   119      200  OK         -  -  -  (empty)  -  -  -  FWK4NW22KWWiB462p1  text/json  FzCk3uWDE3YjVKkb    -
Jun 18 02:35:02 CaBfuW2tjnMVk7FnIl  107.160.46.226  3747   141.142.234.27  2375  1  GET   141.142.234.27   
  /version                                                                                 -  Python-urllib/2.7        
  0    145      200  OK         -  -  -  (empty)  -  -  -  -                   -          FISSYk4kMVOJ8A9wv1  text/json
Jun 18 02:35:02 CSI7QrHUkubbD8nU1   107.160.46.226  3750   141.142.234.27  2375  1  POST  141.142.234.27   
  /v1.23/containers/6df61c916b1aee2d72046ce92bbbc16dd01c9dfb847faa12286c9e3bcd5d745c/exec  -  python-requests/2.10.0   
  246  74       201  Created    -  -  -  (empty)  -  -  -  FLzVNf1jnhEtYjki2j  text/json  FfkBeY1jz0SEpgK0K   text/json
 Exploit: Logins vs. non-work time
Can we analyze a log to show entries of login activity outside of normal working 
hours?
● What service do we want to check against?
○ ssh
● What logs provide this information?
○ /var/log/secure, /var/log/messages or /var/log/syslog
○ Bro's ssh.log
● How to compare time of day?
○ Use bro-cut to convert ts column to parsable local time.
○ Use awk's substr() function for hour of the day.
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 Break it down
cat ssh.log |
 bro-cut -C -d ts id.orig_h id.resp_h auth_success direction
[snipped]
#open   2017-06-24-00-00-38
#fields ts  id.orig_h   id.resp_h   auth_successdirection
#types  string  addr addr bool enum
2017-01-24T03:33:58-0400    121.48.18.25   10.0.1.5  -   INBOUND
2017-01-24T03:43:58-0400    121.48.18.25   10.0.1.5  -   INBOUND
2017-01-24T03:53:58-0400    121.48.18.25   10.0.1.5  -   INBOUND
2017-01-24T04:03:58-0400    121.48.18.25   10.0.1.5  -   INBOUND
2017-01-24T04:04:27-0400    10.0.1.10    16.180.57.224 T   OUTBOUND
2017-01-24T04:05:14-0400    10.0.1.10    200.112.224.16 T   OUTBOUND
2017-01-24T04:13:58-0400    121.48.18.25   10.0.1.5  T   INBOUND
2017-01-24T04:17:39-0400    10.0.1.10    117.215.172.107 T   OUTBOUND
2017-01-24T04:22:14-0400    10.0.1.10    84.190.173.0   T   OUTBOUND
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 Break it down (getting a sub string)
substr(<string>, <starting index*>, <length of substring>)
(*starting index is from 1, not 0.)
substr("this is easy", 9, 4);
easy
($1 = 2017-01-24T04:03:58-0400)
substr($1,12,2)
04
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 Break it down (Doing comparisons)
$0!~/^#/  (Don't print lines starting with comment characters)
$4=="T" && $5=="INBOUND" (Successful inbound logins)
if (true) { do something } else { do something else }
if (hour < 9 || hour >= 17) { print } (♫ Not Workin' 9 to 5 ♫)
true && true || false { print }
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 Exploit: Logins vs. non-work time
(Check for inbound successful logs not between 9am and 5pm)
$ cat ssh.log |
 bro-cut -C -d ts id.orig_h id.resp_h auth_success direction |
 awk -F\\t '$0!~/^#/ && $4=="T" && $5 == "INBOUND" 
 { hour=int(substr($1,12,2)); if (hour < 9 || hour >= 17)     
  {print}}' | less -S
2017-04-01T06:45:18-0400 154.19.91.90     10.0.4.26  T  INBOUND
2017-04-01T06:47:13-0400 154.19.91.90     10.0.1.5   T  INBOUND
2017-04-01T19:05:44-0400 154.19.91.90     10.0.1.5   T  INBOUND
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 Exploit: Logins vs. non-work time
● Alternate way using modulus of epoch time.
● % is modulus operator, gives you the remainder after 
division.
● Unix epoch time modulo 86400 will give you the same time of 
day no matter what the day
$ cat ssh.log |
  awk -F\\t '$8=="T" && $9 == "INBOUND" &&
  ($1 % 86400 < 43200 || $1 % 86400 > 75600) {print}' |
  less -S
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 Exploit: Two factor auth analysis
Can we determine if our first level authentication has 
been compromised by analyzing our second level 
authentication?
Duo log format:
Timestamp,User,Integration,Factor,IP \
Address,Result,Reason,Enrollment,Device,Country,State,City
2016-09-05 16:48:22 UTC,jskeens,ACME VPN,Duo \ 
Push,34.207.155.20,SUCCESS,,No,,US,Texas,Houston
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 Exploit: Two factor auth analysis
( Show all failures to auth to Duo )
$ awk -F, ' $6=="FAILURE" ' duolog.csv
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( Show failures from non-work geo locations )
$ awk -F, ' $6=="FAILURE" && $10 == "US" && $12 !~ 
/(Houston|New York City)/ ' duolog.csv
(Or you may want to look for successes too for comparison)
 Break it down: awk array primer
● An array stores a set of values.  ['a', 10, "kiwi", "192.168.0.5", .... ]
● You can perform operations on the array and it's values.
● a[0] = "Tabitha Gallagher"   (store a value by numeric index)
● a['tgallagher'] = "Tabitha Gallagher"   (store a value by text key)
● users['ishort']['name'] = "Ira Short"  (A multi-dimensional array is 
an array of arrays)
● users['ishort']['age'] = 45      (now the 'ishort' key points to an array with 
2 keys)
● users['jmoody']['name'] = "Jared Moody"
● for (u in users) { print users[u]['name'] }     (Loop over keys in 
an array)
● length(users)   (Get the number of keys in the 'users' array)
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 Exploit: Two factor auth analysis (cont.)
(Show failures followed by a success on the same day.)
$ awk -F, '{ key=substr($1,1,10) $2; if($6=="FAILURE"){ 
a[key]++ }; if($6=="SUCCESS" && a[key]){ printf("%s,%s\n", 
a[key] " Failures prior", $0); a[key]=0}}' duolog.csv
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(Show same user logs from two different geo locations on same 
day.)
$ awk -F, '/^2/ && $10!="" { key1=substr($1,1,10) $2; key2=$10 
"," $11 "," $12; a[key1][key2]=$0; if(length(a[key1]) > 1){ 
for (i in a[key1]) { print a[key1][i]  } }}' duolog.csv | sort 
| uniq
 Exploit: Brute force attempts
Can I analyze login data to look for indications of 
someone trying to brute force my AD account?
Do you have access to authentication logs?
Yes, they are downloadable in CSV format:
Timestamp (EDT),IP,Type,Country
2017-05-31 14:40:05,10.234.33.141,4771,US
2017-05-31 14:38:27,10.234.33.141,4771,US
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 Exploit: Logins vs. non-work time
$ cut -c1-10 mkrenz_ad.csv | sort | uniq -c | tail -n 20
→ 286 2017-05-20
296 2017-05-21
237 2017-05-22
257 2017-05-23
248 2017-05-24
280 2017-05-25
     19 2017-05-26
    1 2017-05-29
 861 2017-05-30
  27398 2017-05-31
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 Phases of Compromise
1. Reconnaissance
2. Exploitation
3. Reinforcement
4. Consolidation
5. Pillage
NSF Cybersecurity Summit 2017 -- August 15th, 2017
Security Log Analysis
 Compromise 3: Reinforcement
How can we detect when someone installs a backdoor?
● What type of service is being backdoored?
○ SSH
● How could we tell if it's been backdoored?
○ SSH server version number change
○ Server side binary file size or checksum
● What logs can we use for version change?
○ Bro's ssh.log
● What tool can we use to detect a change?
○ awk: Store the last version seen and compare with current line's version
○ if (lastversion != $4) { print; lastversion=$4 }
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 Compromise 3: Reinforcement
From software.log:
Jul 27 19:32:19 141.142.227.45 22 SSH::SERVER OpenSSH_6.6.1p1
Jul 27 20:29:39 141.142.227.45 22 SSH::SERVER OpenSSH_6.6.1p1
Jul 27 22:27:53 141.142.227.45 22 SSH::SERVER OpenSSH_6.6.1p1
Jul 27 23:30:34 141.142.227.45 22 SSH::SERVER OpenSSH_6.5.1p1
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 Compromise 3: Reinforcement
From software.log:
Jul 27 19:32:19 141.142.227.45 22 SSH::SERVER OpenSSH_6.6.1p1
Jul 27 20:29:39 141.142.227.45 22 SSH::SERVER OpenSSH_6.6.1p1
Jul 27 22:27:53 141.142.227.45 22 SSH::SERVER OpenSSH_6.6.1p1
Jul 27 23:30:34 141.142.227.45 22 SSH::SERVER OpenSSH_6.5.1p1
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 Compromise 3: Command
$ cat software.log | 
bro-cut -C -d ts host host_p unparsed_version |
awk -F\\t '$2=="141.142.227.45" && $3=="22"
{ if (lastversion != $4) { print; lastversion=$4 } }'
→
Jul 27 22:27:53 141.142.227.45 22 OpenSSH_6.6.1p1
Jul 27 23:30:34 141.142.227.45 22 OpenSSH_6.5.1p1
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 Finding Compromised Accounts
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 Bro Logs
● mysql
● http
● irc
● conn
● software
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 Authentication Logs
1. Successful login by "deprovisioned" user
2. Logins at strange hours (or during vacation)
3. Obvious scanning activity (ie. 2+ different users, 1 IP)
4. Multiple failures followed by a success
5. GeoIP data (where is the user coming from?)
6. Authentication from non-client device (ie. web server 
to web server)
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 MySQL Logs
● ts: Timestamp for the event
● uid: Unique ID for the connection
● id: orig_h, orig_p, resp_h, resp_p
● cmd: The command that was issued
● arg: The argument issued to the cmd
● success: Did the command succeed?
● rows: The number of affected rows
● response: Server message
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 MySQL Logs (mysql.log)
1. Detect vulnerable web servers (SQLi)
2. Look for large number of rows being returned.
3. select unhex('7F454C40000E9...00') into dumpfile 
'/usr/lib64/mysql/plugin/unknown/xiaoji64.so'
4. Multiple authentication failures
5. Authentication from unsanctioned IPs.
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 MySQL log analysis
(Checking for large number of returned rows)
$ cat mysql.log | 
bro-cut -C -d ts id.orig_h id.resp_h success rows |
awk -F\\t '$3=="T" && $4 > 1000 { print }'
(Check if any thing ran a select into dumpfile. Simple.)
$ grep -i "select.*into dumpfile" mysql.log
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 MySQL log analysis (cont.)
(SQL queries coming from odd networks or hosts)
$ cat mysql.log | 
bro-cut -C -d ts id.orig_h id.resp_h success |
awk -F\\t '$2 !~ /^172\.16\.50\./ && $3=="T" { print }'
(Detecting SQL exploit attempts)
$ grep -- "--" mysql.log
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Image source: https://xkcd.com/327/
 HTTP Logs
 id.resp_h 91.134.161.42
id.resp_p 80
method GET
host www.ncsa.edu
uri /
referrer shibboleth.ncsa.eu/idp/profile/SAML2
user_agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
status_code 200
resp_mime_types text/html
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 HTTP Logs
● Referrer mismatch
● File type mismatch (a.jpg is x-dosexec)
● Header abuse (HTTPoxy)
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 Phases of Compromise
1. Reconnaissance
2. Exploitation
3. Reinforcement
4. Consolidation
5. Pillage
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 IRC Logs
10.0.5.87:4766 -> 164.32.77.23:6667
JOIN #miraic irc.log Value
id.orig_h 10.0.5.87
id.orig_p 4766
id.resp_h 164.32.77.23
id.resp_p 6667
nick bot1656
user bot1656
command
v
JOIN
value #miraic
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 IRC Logs
● Infected host connects back to C&C channel on IRC 
server to check in and receive commands.
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 Phases of Compromise
1. Reconnaissance
2. Exploitation
3. Reinforcement
4. Consolidation
5. Pillage
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 Conn Logs
● Exfil - large flows
● Protocol mismatches (ssh over tcp/80)
● Missing protocols (udp/53, but not DNS)
● Entropy analysis
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 Pillage: Large exfiltrations of data
(Large outbound transfers from sensitive networks)
$ cat conn.log | 
bro-cut -C -d ts id.orig_h id.resp_h resp_ip_bytes |
awk -F\\t '$3~/^172\.17\.50\./ && $4 > 100000000 
{ print }'
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Image source: http://en.rocketnews24.com/
 Pillage: Large exfiltrations of data
(Large outbound transfers from sensitive networks)
$ cat conn.log | 
bro-cut -C -d ts id.orig_h id.resp_h resp_ip_bytes |
awk -F\\t '$3~/^172\.17\.50\./ && $4 > 100000000 
{ print }'
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→ 
2017-05-26T13:08:32-0400    172.17.50.7 172.17.49.42    3020603598
2017-05-26T15:11:04-0400    172.17.50.7 16.58.192.193   5031339532
2017-05-26T18:09:24-0400    172.17.50.2 57.49.32.164    171755661
2017-05-26T22:15:40-0400    172.17.50.8 172.16.9.5     1420997210
 Pillage: Protocol mismatch
(Show instances of ssh running on port 80 or 443)
$ cat conn.log | 
bro-cut -C -d ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p service |
awk -F\\t '($4 == 80 || $4 == 443) && $5 == "ssh"'
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→ 
2017-05-02T04:03:34-0400    172.17.40.104 42.71.10.49 443 ssh
Image source: http://s2.quickmeme.com/
 Putting It All Together: Intelligence
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
IP addresses involved:
64.39.106.131 is doing recon scans
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
URLs:
http://18a43zad864bo96.armlay.gdn/    
is hosting malware
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
Software versions:
OpenSSH_6.5.1p1 is outdated and might be 
trojaned
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
E-mail addresses:
vladg@illinois.edu is sending malicious 
attachments
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
Domain names:
ncsa.eu is a phishing site
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
File hashes:
3aac91181c3b7eb34fb7d2b6dd673f4827fcf07 
is a Flash exploit
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
File names:
r00tkit.tgz is a legitimate Linux ISO
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
SSL certificate hashes:
EC:50:1C:4A:...:A2:4C:C6:60:CC:49:03:86 is 
the default Ubuntu snake oil key with a 
well known private key
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
A system or account was compromised. Search *.log 
and generate indicators of compromise:
Pub key hashes:
a1:73:d1:e1:25:72:79:..:ed:81:bf:67:98 
is a trojaned sshd
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
Once you have indicators of compromise, you can 
search your historical logs to find other compromised 
accounts or systems. Some might have different TTPs, 
which generate more indicators.
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 Post-Mortem Analysis
Perhaps more importantly, you can use Bro's Intel 
framework to load your indicators and be alerted when 
they're seen in the future.
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 Indicator Type Comment Notice?
64.39.106.131 ADDR Recon scan F
http://18a43zad864bo96.armlay
.gdn/ URL
Hosting 
malware T
ncsa.eu DOMAIN Phishing site T
r00tkit.tgz FILE_NAME Malware T
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 CTSC webinar series: trustedci.org/webinars
Mailing list: trustedci.org/ctsc-email-lists
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